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The year 1569 is one of the most critical dates in Polish and Lithuanian history. This year 
marks the Union of Lublin, a constitutional settlement that brought the Kingdom of Poland and 
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania together into a loose confederation known as the Rzeczpospolita 
Obojga Narodów, or the Commonwealth of Both Nations, the largest polity in Latin-Christian 
Europe.1 This state occupied the eastern edge of Europe and was distinctive from its western 
neighbors in a number of important ways. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth covered a 
much greater land area, stretching from the Black Sea to the Baltic and encompassing much of 
what is today Poland, Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States. This unique geographic position 
contributed to a cosmopolitan blend of East and West visible in everything from language to 
dress, combining a largely feudal economic and military system with relative religious toleration 
and political freedoms, at least for the aristocracy. This nobility, known as the szlachta, was a 
social class particular to the Commonwealth, comprising a higher share of the population than in 
any other European nation and enjoying an unprecedented array of rights and privileges.2 
Similarly unique was the religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity of the Commonwealth. Its vast 
territory incorporated Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Orthodox Christians and Protestants. It also 
included trader communities from as far afield as Armenia and Persia. These people used a 
variety of languages, including Latin, Polish, Ruthenian, German and Yiddish, and maintained a 
high standard of literacy and education, even among women and the non-aristocracy.3   
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The Commonwealth’s political system was also distinctive. As Norman Davies aptly 
observed, “Its laws and practices were inspired by deeply rooted beliefs in individual freedom 
and civil liberty which, for the period, were exceptional.”4 The szlachta considered themselves 
citizens rather than subjects,5 and despite wide disparities in wealth and power, were legally 
equal. A common phrase captured this sentiment well: “a nobleman on his garden patch was any 
Wojewoda’s [administrator’s] match.”6 This equality extended all the way up to the throne, as 
the Commonwealth’s government was predicated on the concept of joint rule between the 
szlachta and the king. Therefore, unlike the absolutist monarchies gaining power in France and 
Spain, the Commonwealth maintained a weak central authority and functioned essentially as a 
republic. Within this unique arrangement, local decisions were left to the sejmiki, or dietines, 
which then nominated delegates to the Sejm, or diet, in order to represent the Commonwealth as 
a whole. The king governed alongside the Sejm, which held the exclusive power to make laws, 
wage war, levy taxes and determine foreign policy. Since decisions of the Sejm had to be 
unanimous, a strong emphasis was put on agreement through consensus-building.7 It also 
resulted in a climate where, “the nobility constantly suspected the ruler of machinations to 
extend his powers.”8 These potentially competing dynamics of consensus and suspicion were a 
hallmark of the Commonwealth’s political system and set it apart from its neighbors. Together, 
these unique geographical, social and political factors made the Commonwealth perhaps 
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Europe's strangest state. Nevertheless, it operated as an important player on the European stage9 
and earned the admiration of both foreign and domestic observers. 
Despite enjoying general peace and prosperity for approximately the first 80 years of its 
existence, the Commonwealth was soon beset by a variety of threats, both foreign and domestic. 
Consequently, the 17th and 18th centuries saw Poland and Lithuania’s gradual decline, as the 
central government was unable to defend its borders and the political system was co-opted by 
powerful magnates and foreign powers for their own agendas. Though the Commonwealth 
eventually produced Europe’s first written constitution and conducted a series of important 
reforms in its final years, it was partitioned three times between 1772 and 1795 at the hands of 
Austria, Prussia and Russia.  
The question of what exactly caused this fall from an influential European power to a 
casualty of rising nation-states has been traced by many historians to the concept of the Golden 
Liberty. This rather nebulous term was used both to encapsulate the impressive array of rights 
and privileges guaranteed to the szlachta and to define the political system of the 
Commonwealth. These included freedom from taxation and arbitrary arrest, as well as religious 
toleration and restrictions on the power of the monarch to raise troops, levy taxes or declare war 
without the consent of the nobility. The Golden Liberty also ensured the right of rokosz, or 
insurrection, in response to perceived infringement of these rights. Finally, there was the 
Liberum Veto, or ability for any single delegate to veto the decisions of a particular Sejm, which 
was seen as the capstone of the Golden Liberty.  
 
9 Anna Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, trans. Daniel J. Sax, Queen Liberty: The Concept of Freedom in the  
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 2. 
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The foundational privileges of the Golden Liberty in many cases predated the 
establishment of the Commonwealth itself and tended to expand in scope over time. For 
example, the Privilege of Koszyce in 1374 virtually exempted the Polish szlachta from 
taxation.10 Consequently, the szlachta generally opposed efforts to levy taxes of any sort on their 
estate, even for the purpose of national defense. Similarly, statutes in 1430 and 1433 ensured the 
szlachta’s freedom from arbitrary arrest. Religious toleration had also enjoyed a long tradition in 
Poland and Lithuania, but it was not a formal guarantee until the 1573 Confederation of Warsaw. 
Fears of religious persecution had been validated by events elsewhere in Europe, specifically the 
1572 Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre and the strife of the Thirty Years' War abroad. 
Consequently, toleration was considered essential to preserving liberty.  
Since the Golden Liberty extended many rights to the nobility, it also necessarily 
prevented the monarchy from infringing on those privileges. The Nihil Novi Act of 1505 ensured 
that the king could not pass laws without the consent of the gentry, cementing the power of the 
szlachta in the political system. This prerogative was jealously guarded; members of the 1702 
Sejm asserted that King August II’s (1670 - 1733) waging of war without a declaration of the 
Sejm trampled upon their freedom, and countless military reforms, tax proposals, and other 
attempts to centralize power on behalf of the king were opposed on the grounds that they limited 
the power of the gentry and thus endangered their liberty.  
In addition to the formidable shackles on the king’s authority, the szlachta still had at 
their disposal a mechanism to protect their liberty by force. The rokosz, which was essentially an 
 
10 These concessions also made the szlachta exempt from building and repairing castles, towns and bridges, as well 
as paying for the travel of the royal court, while also guaranteeing the gentry compensation for military service and 
restricting foreigner’s access to certain royal offices. 
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armed lobby formed in protest to perceived infringements on noble rights, was perhaps the most 
extraordinary aspect of the Commonwealth’s political system. It was also regularly exercised to 
protect perceived attacks on the Golden Liberty: the orchestrators of both the Zebrzydowski and 
Lubomirski rokosz in 1606 and 1666-67 respectively saw themselves not as rebels or rival 
claimants to the throne, but as protectors of the szlachta’s freedom from absolutism.  
While all of these noble privileges were key components of freedom in the 
Commonwealth, its culmination was the Liberum Veto, or the right of a single member of a Sejm 
or sejmik to veto a piece of legislation by exclaiming, “Nie pozwalam!” (“I do not allow it!”). 
The implications of such a tool are not difficult to realize; as the Commonwealth entered its 
twilight years, the Liberum Veto began to loom large. Previously, it had been used to raise 
objections to individual pieces of legislation that were quickly resolved, but it began to be used 
in order to disrupt entire Sejms, scuppering not only the legislation directly vetoed but everything 
else that had been previously decided. Although finally abolished by the Constitution of the 3rd 
of May in 1791, it was far too late at that juncture.  
Historians are largely in agreement that the legislative paralysis induced by the use of the 
Liberum Veto had a detrimental impact on the Commonwealth and contributed to its fall. More 
generally, the Golden Liberty has been identified as a source of weakness if not an outright 
catalyst for the decline of the Polish-Lithuanian state. According to this narrative, the Golden 
Liberty fostered a system of government unable to reform itself in response to societal and 
political changes, vulnerable to interference by foreign powers and powerful domestic interests. 
This in turn resulted in an environment of competition between different organs of government 
and denied the monarchy the authority necessary to function as an effective European state.  
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 Consequently, it is well-supported that the Golden Liberty exerted a significant impact on 
the fall of the Commonwealth, and modern evaluations of this decline have thus focused on the 
influence of the Golden Liberty on political factors within Poland and Lithuania. However, the 
impact of the armed forces on the disintegration of the Commonwealth has received less 
attention. This is an important topic for discussion, as the last century and a half of the 
Commonwealth’s history saw it involved in a series of exhausting conflicts which weakened it 
considerably. Consequently, this paper considers how military factors, specifically lack of a 
professional army, over reliance on cavalry, failed attempts at reform, funding problems, and 
unrestricted power of the magnates precipitated the Commonwealth’s fall.  
In order to chart the Commonwealth’s military decline, I rely on a variety of primary 
sources in both Polish and English, most notably Jan Chryzostom Pasek’s Memoirs of the Polish 
Baroque and Stanisław Żołkiewski’s The Beginning and Progress of the Muscovy War. Both are 
diaries of politically and militarily active seventeenth-century Polish nobles. These works 
provide a first-hand account not only of perceptions of the Golden Liberty, but also its influence 
on military developments. These will be supplemented by primary texts on political and military 
reform, including the writings of Andrzej Fredro and Stanisław Karwicki, which provide 
different perspectives on the political system and reforms within the Commonwealth. I will also 
draw on secondary sources, including Norman Davies’ God’s Playground, for historical context. 
My analysis will also build on the work of previous researchers such as Robert Frost and 
Benedict Wagner-Rundell, who explore the military state of the Commonwealth in the 17th and 




 The period of decline and eventual fall of the Commonwealth coincided with a series of 
wars against Muscovy, Sweden and the Crimean Tatars, as well as Cossack revolts. This decline 
can be traced to a host of factors, most notably the lack of standing troops, predominance of 
cavalry, unsuccessful attempts at military reform, underfunding, and the outsized autonomy of 
magnates.  
Lack of a Standing Army 
One of the overarching themes in the history of the Commonwealth’s military are efforts 
to create a large, permanent army. Although its forces consisted primarily of a variety of levies 
and private military units, the elected monarchs of the Commonwealth realized the need for a 
standing professional army to protect their borders and enact their will. This standing army was 
important in light of changes happening in the rest of Europe, as the military revolution of the 
16-17th centuries brought about a series of profound changes in organization and structure of the 
armed forces. Gone were the days of feudal levies and small cores of heavily-armored knights. 
Instead, the fledgling nation-states of Europe began fielding successively larger standing armies 
of predominantly pike and musket-armed infantry. While conflicts as late as the Thirty Years’ 
War were fought primarily by mercenaries, rulers quickly realized that a standing domestic army 
strengthened the power of monarchs. Kings would no longer have to rely on hiring expensive 
foreign soldiers who would pillage both friend and foe, or slow and unreliable feudal levies of 
peasants and knights. Instead, professional standing armies were directly loyal to the crown and 
always available, meaning rulers had substantially more freedom to pursue their goals, safe in the 
knowledge that their troops could bring both foreign and domestic opposition to heel. This 
9 
swelling of royal power precipitated the growth of nation-states in France, Spain, England and 
elsewhere, and fostered loyalties to a state and ruler rather than to a family or region. Though the 
aristocracy may have resented this vast accumulation of power by the monarch, they were happy 
to no longer see their lands looted by mercenary companies. Additionally, the new army 
provided myriad opportunities for advancement based on merit.11  
While other European powers were busy raising these professional armies, the 
Commonwealth largely stuck to its older military structure, relying on general levies, small 
standing forces, and cobbled-together support from private and mercenary units. The permanent 
forces known as the wojsko kwarciane and its successor, the wojsko komputowe, were often ill-
paid and small, something which would plague the Commonwealth, particularly after 1648. At 
the beginning of the 18th century, the wojsko komputowe numbered only 24,000 men, which 
paled in comparison to the hundreds of thousands of troops the soon-to-be partitioning powers of 
Prussia, Austria and Russia could bring to bear.12 
Some have argued that this failure to modernize the military stemmed from a close-
minded resistance to reform among the nobility.13 While this perspective does not necessarily 
make an explicit connection to ideals of the Golden Liberty, many members of the szlachta felt 
the Commonwealth had reached its zenith in terms of freedom and prosperity, and bitterly 
opposed any changes to the status quo.14 Others argue for a more nuanced perspective, positing 
that the failure to expand the standing army represented not a knee-jerk opposition to military 
 
11 Robert Ian Frost, “The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the ‘Military Revolution'” in  
Poland and Europe: Historical Dimensions: Selected Essays from the Fiftieth Anniversary International Congress 
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12 Frost, 24. 
13 Frost, 23. 
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reforms per se, but a conscious rejection of the power this would give the monarchy15. Historians 
cite many examples of innovations the Commonwealth was willing to make without having to 
modify its political structure, for instance the establishment of weapon foundries and penning of 
influential treatises on siegecraft.16 Essentially, the nobility was happy to adopt certain aspects of 
the military revolution as long as they did not change the political status quo.  
Regardless of the motivation behind the szlachta’s rejection of a large standing army, the 
impact was essentially the same. In the words of Robert Frost: “For it was the failure of the noble 
citizens of the Commonwealth to cross this psychological watershed [establishment of a 
permanent army] which doomed it to a decline which was by no means inevitable.”17 The 
nobility perceived a standing army as a fundamental threat to their liberty, since it would allow 
the monarch to bypass the diet, which was normally required to levy and pay troops as well as 
declare war. As a result, the gentry were generally opposed to efforts to enlarge the military, and 
remained more concerned about the threat of absolutist monarchy than foreign invasion18. This 
was rationalized by the military successes of Poland and Lithuania at the end of the sixteenth and 
in the first half of the seventeenth century, which prevented many nobles from recognizing the 
threat posed by their neighbors.19 Unfortunately, this myopic perspective would have disastrous 
consequences when the outdated, underpaid and untrained military of the Commonwealth – far 
from being able to serve as a tool of monarchical oppression – was unable to defend the nation 
against foreign invasion. 
 
15 Frost, The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Military Revolution, 24. 
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The history of what has become known as the Cossack Register is an excellent example 
of the impact of the szlachta’s reluctance to enlarge the army. Established in 1572, the Register 
was a list of names of Cossacks, a people inhabiting Ukraine. The Register integrated these 
individuals into the army of the Commonwealth, granting them special privileges and wages in 
an attempt to discourage raiding and turn them into a regular fighting force.20 This was 
conceptually an excellent solution; it converted the Cossacks from a potential threat into highly 
loyal and fierce troops able to defend the Commonwealth from Tatar and Muscovite incursions. 
In practice, it was significantly less effective, as the Crown was not able to consistently pay the 
Cossacks, who continued raiding and plundering with little regard for whether they were part of 
the Register or not.21 Additionally, local diets tended to be resentful of the rights granted to the 
Cossacks, and consistently tried to shrink or abolish the Register. This hostility is typified by one 
Polish noble in the Sejm, who quipped: “You [Cossacks] say that you are like all others members 
of the Commonwealth and thus demand the rights of the nobility. Verily, you are indeed 
members of this Commonwealth, but like finger-nails, meaning you must from time to time be 
trimmed.”22  
This arrogance belied a fear that the king would use the Register in order to limit the 
szlachta’s freedoms.23 Not only would the Register provide the monarch with a larger standing 
army, but it would eliminate the Cossack’s dependence on the local szlachta, since their wages 
and privileges would come directly from the king. These fears about royal power and Cossack 
 
20 Linda Gordon, Cossack Rebellions: Social Turmoil in the Sixteenth-Century Ukraine (Albany:  
State University of New York Press, 1983) 90. 
21 Gordon, 95. 
22 Zbigniew Wójcik, Dzikie Pola w Ogniu; o Kozaczyźnie w Dawnej Rzeczypospolitej (Warsaw: Wiedza 
Powszechna, 1968), 110. (Author’s translation) As cited in Davies, God’s Playground, 446.  
23 Gordon, Cossack Rebellions, 94. 
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autonomy may have been overblown, however, since despite nominally being part of the royal 
standing army, the Register Cossacks reported to local magnates, who deployed them in 
conjunction with their own private troops without having to pay for their upkeep.24 Nevertheless, 
families such as the Wiśniowiecki or Kalinowski saw a large, organized force of Cossacks as a 
threat to their interests. Consequently, the szlachta and powerful magnates tried to limit the size 
of the Register once any immediate threat had passed, while the Cossacks, who maintained their 
loyalty to the throne and instead saw the local nobility as oppressors, tried to permanently 
enlarge the size of the Register.25 Since the king generally strove to increase Cossack recruitment 
and the Cossacks lacked direct representation in the Sejm, the political struggle over the Register 
primarily pitted the szlachta against the monarchy.  
In the rare instance that the interests of the magnates and monarch concerning the number 
of troops coincided, the former were known to oppose efforts to expand the army on the grounds 
that they were illegal. This occurred most notably in 1646, when King Władysław IV (1595 - 
1648) attempted to recruit Cossacks for a war against the Ottomans and Tatars without approval 
of the diet. Despite saying that he supported the king’s policy, Great Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński 
(1595 - 1650) and other magnates refused to sign off on the recruitment on the grounds that it 
was not legal.26 Legalism was a common feature of szlachta political thought, and respect for the 
laws was seen as the duty of every noble.27 Thus, both personal interest and a concern with 
preserving “the rule of law” could put the magnates at odds with increasing the Register.  
 
24 Gordon, 94. 
25 Frost, The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Military Revolution, 41. 
26 Koyama, The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a Political Space, 147-148. 
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These various tensions rather inevitably came to a head with the Chmielnicki Uprising in 
1648. Poor relations between the Polish Catholic nobility and their Orthodox Ukrainian subjects 
prompted the Ukrainian peasantry to ally themselves with the Cossacks and revolt. The rebel 
forces won a series of victories, plunging Ukraine into chaos and permanently damaging 
Commonwealth-Cossack relations. As a result of this conflict, the Register essentially ceased to 
function after 1648, leaving behind a void that was never successfully filled. The Cossack’s 
absence would be felt when Sweden invaded in 1655, and the beleaguered Commonwealth, beset 
by threats from Muscovy, Sweden, Transylvania and the Ottoman Empire, began to cede 
territory to its rivals. Soon, Poland and Lithuania had to face internal threats in the form of the 
Lubomirski Uprising, a response to attempts at reform from King Jan Kazimierz (1609 - 1672). 
These costly conflicts slowly sapped Poland-Lithuania’s strength, leading to the eventual 
partitions starting in 1772. One cannot but wonder if the enlargement or preservation of the 
Cossack Register may have served to delay or even prevent the collapse of the Commonwealth, 
especially considering that in the aftermath of the Chmielnicki Uprising, many of the 
disillusioned Cossacks switched their allegiance to Russia, one of the eventual partitioning 
powers.  
The controversy surrounding the Cossack Register and the subsequent Chmielnicki 
Uprising deprived the Commonwealth of a large force of excellent infantry that would be sorely 
missed in the coming years. Additionally, it resulted in the loss of lands used for extensive 
taxation and recruitment.28 This crippling blow to Poland-Lithuania became apparent during the 
Swedish invasion of 1655. Though the tide was eventually turned, this was in part due to foreign 
pressure, as the Commonwealth desperately cast about for allies willing to contribute much-
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needed infantry and artillery required to reduce Swedish garrisons and actually drive out the 
invaders. In previous conflicts, these forces had been supplied by the Cossacks,29 giving the 
Commonwealth’s armies the vital ability to take and hold ground.  
Predominance of Cavalry 
This lack of infantry and preponderance of cavalry was itself a factor leading to the 
Commonwealth’s decline. Both Polish and Lithuanian forces included a much higher ratio of 
cavalry and significantly fewer pikemen than their European neighbors. This was because the 
Great European Plain along much of the Commonwealth’s southern and eastern borders offered 
little in the way of natural barriers, and there were few fortresses that would require infantry or 
artillery to attack or defend. Additionally, opponents such as the Tatars fought as light cavalry, 
meaning a highly mobile, decentralized force of cavalry was required for defense.30  
However, this preference for horsemen was more than tactical; it represented the 
conscious reflection of cultural and philosophical ideas into the military sphere. Traditionally, 
the szlachta believed that they had received the rights and privileges of the Golden Liberty in 
return for their military service to the crown.31 Thus, allowing foreign mercenaries or non-nobles 
(such as the Cossacks) to fight in the army potentially jeopardized the nobles’ liberty. 
Consequently, warfare, like many other things in the Commonwealth, was seen as the 
prerogative of the gentry, who almost exclusively fought mounted. In fact, Andrzej Fredro 
(1620-1679), a notable supporter of the Golden Liberty, talked about horsemen being soldiers of 
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30 Frost, 27. 
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a free republic, while infantry were a tool of autocracy.32 This penchant for mounted warfare was 
also supported by cultural traditions among the nobility. Well-bred horses were both plentiful 
and highly-prized, and horsemanship was learned from a young age. Similarly, fencing both on 
foot and horseback was taught to young nobles by experienced veterans, ensuring that the 
Commonwealth was known far and wide for its excellent swordsmen.33 This, coupled with a lack 
of formal military academies, meant that szlachta culture bred independent and accomplished 
horsemen and fencers rather than the trained and disciplined members of an officer corps or 
infantry formation. Considering all these factors, it is hardly surprising that the Commonwealth 
armies tended to consist primarily of horse. 
Despite the varying reasons for the dominance of cavalry, Commonwealth military 
reformers and leaders recognized the need for more and better infantry, particularly in response 
to facing more “Westernized” militaries such as Sweden’s. Though Fredro had been an 
ideological supporter of cavalry, he authored a 1670 treatise which seemed to largely reverse his 
stance from two years prior. He advocated for greater use of infantry and encouraged the gentry 
to fight on foot, referencing the effectiveness of an all-noble infantry regiment during the 1581 
campaign against Muscovy.34 The notable reformer Stanisław Karwicki (c. 1640 - c. 1725) was 
also a great proponent of infantry, arguing that it should constitute a higher ratio of the 
Commonwealth’s armies. He stated that more infantry was necessary to compete with more 
Westernized armies because they were better suited to siege warfare and more dependable.35 He 
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also criticized the Commonwealth’s noble cavalry: “But in the cavalry of our army, a soldier is 
known as towarzysz [comrade], inflated with his own opinion and even more with his property, 
considers himself equal to his officers, even the Hetmans [military commanders], and cooly 
tolerates commands of his superiors. Infantry in regiments, by contrast, much more diligently 
applies itself to the orders of its superiors.”36 The term towarzysz was used throughout the 
Commonwealth’s military, regardless of rank, and was intended to represent equality among the 
nobility.37 In addition to this preoccupation with equality, Karwicki also accused the gentry of 
campaigning with lavish baggage trains and being more interested in taking part in sejmiks as 
opposed to fighting for the Fatherland.38 All these critiques imply that the nobility’s priorities 
were political influence and social standing as opposed to warfare. It was not just Karwicki who 
harped on these vices. Fredro likewise spends much of his overview of the military discussing 
methods for improving discipline and training, demonstrating that the poor behavior of the army 
and cavalry in particular was common knowledge.39  
These calls for change did not fall completely on deaf ears. Infantry played an 
increasingly prominent role in the armed forces, acquitting themselves particularly well in the 
Swedish wars,40 but the Commonwealth struggled to deploy and pay substantial and well-trained 
infantry units. In his memoirs, Początek i Progres Wojny Moskiewskiej (Beginning and Progress 
of the Muscovite War), Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski (1547 - 1620) recounts how the siege of 
Smolensk in 1609 was delayed because of a lack of infantry and artillery. Crucially, it was the 
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arrival of allied Cossacks which finally allowed the Commonwealth to make headway.41 A 
similar problem would face Żółkiewski’s forces during the Battle of Kłuszyn, when Polish 
winged hussars were forced to break through picket fences and charge dug-in Russian infantry, a 
task normally reserved for infantry.42 This deficiency in foot soldiers was further on display in 
1656, when a Polish force attacked Brandenburg in an effort to induce it to sever its alliance with 
Sweden. However, the invasion force consisted primarily of cavalry, and was unable to capture 
any cities. As a result, it contented itself with raiding and failed to put any significant pressure on 
Brandenburg to desert the Swedish cause.43 These examples serve to illustrate problems facing 
the Commonwealth’s military operations owing to its lack of infantry. Overall, the increased cost 
of cavalry and its inability to compete with modernized armies made largely mounted forces just 
another symptom of the decline of the Commonwealth. 
Attempts at Reform 
While there were many forces opposing changes to the military status quo, there were 
also attempts at reform. The reigns of Jan Kazimierz Wasa (1648-1668) and August II (1697-
1706, 1709-1733) represent two concerted efforts at structural reform of the Commonwealth’s 
military. They also highlight the dynamics that made reform so difficult in the Commonwealth. 
Jan Kazimierz was very popular with the army, and proved himself a canny general, leading 
royal troops to a resounding victory over the Cossacks at the Battle of Beresteczko in 1651.44 
However, like most of the Commonwealth’s elected monarchs, he chafed at the power of the 
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diet, and tried to use the army in order to bypass its authority. To this end, he attempted a variety 
of military reforms, designating many army units as “royal,” and making sure they were paid by 
and directly loyal to the monarch.45 He also tried to enlarge the wojsko komputowe directly and 
through an increase in the size of the Cossack Register. He also attempted to centralize military 
power in his own person by not nominating new Hetmans, or military commanders.46 These 
military reforms were also coupled with a variety of plans surrounding the impending royal 
election.  
Nevertheless, his reforms met resistance, particularly the Vivente Rege, or election of the 
next king while the current monarch was still living. This controversy prevented the 
Commonwealth from successfully conducting the war against Muscovy and eventually led to the 
Lubomirski Rokosz of 1665-1666. Perhaps even more importantly, Jan Kazimierz’s efforts 
forever tainted plans to enlarge the military in the eyes of the nobility, largely condemning future 
desultory efforts to increase the size of the army. According to Frost: “The greatest danger to 
Polish liberties, it seemed, was the Polish monarchy and its alleged wish to introduce absolutum 
dominium by force of arms; it was therefore vital to prevent it building up the sort of military 
powerbase which Jan Kazimierz had attempted to construct.”47 Consequently, his reign 
represented perhaps the last real opportunity to modernize and reform the military of the 
Commonwealth.48   
The reign of August II also saw the thwarting of efforts to enlarge the standing army. The 
Sejm of 1712-1713 proposed a variety of reforms, including a permanent force of 36,000 troops 
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and the necessary permanent taxes to pay them.49 Interestingly, this proposal seems to have met 
little opposition, as the szlachta resented the increasing presence of Swedish, Russian and Saxon 
armies in the Commonwealth, which were known for exacting “contributions'' from the local 
populace. Consequently, August II’s supporters were quick to represent this new force and the 
associated funding as a way to protect the ever-important Golden Liberty from foreign 
encroachment. However, many envoys to the Sejm saw the main problem to be not the lack of 
appropriate military funding, but the damage to szlachta property from marauding armies.50 
These excesses were pinned on the Hetmans for not maintaining better behavior among their 
troops, echoing concerns held by Fredro surrounding discipline,51 and likely influencing 
Karwicki’s proposals to limit their power.52  As a result, the focus of the Sejm shifted from 
military reforms to curbing the power of the Hetmans and restricting licentious and immoral 
behavior. This shows that even when the gentry were willing to enlarge and modernize the army, 
it was seen as tangential to the preservation of property rights. Commissions to address property 
damages and the culpability of the Hetmans were proposed, but negotiations quickly bogged 
down. Eventually, supporters of one of the Hetmans exercised the Liberum Veto, breaking the 
Sejm and dooming the entire package of legislation, including the increase to the size of the 
army.53 The nobility were primarily concerned with the threat to their private property rather 
than the threat of foreign encroachment. As a result, they seized on immorality and the power of 
the Hetmans as the fundamental issue, rather than the need to strengthen the army.  
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Thus, it is evident that both the gentry and the monarch were engaged in a zero-sum 
battle for power with the military as a key institution affecting the struggle. Even militarily 
successful kings such as Zygmunt III (1566 - 1632) or Jan Sobieski (1629 - 1696) were 
perceived by the gentry as a threat, since their attempts at expanding the Commonwealth were 
seen as warmongering and a dangerous step towards absolutism.54 By keeping the wojsko 
komputowe small, the nobility ensured that the monarch was dependent on the senate and diets, 
giving the szlachta power and thus by extension liberty.  Though both Jan Kazimierz and August 
II had very real opportunities to reform the military, they were unable to garner sufficient support 
for their efforts, which subsequently failed because of political considerations not directly related 
to the military.  
Underfunding of the Military 
While the calls to enlarge and modernize the army were ongoing, the Commonwealth’s 
military was frequently unable to pay the soldiers it already had, leaving commanders with only 
emotional appeals to secure their troops' continued cooperation. The memoir of Hetman 
Stanisław Żółkiewski routinely deals with the chronic underfunding of the Commonwealth’s 
invasion of Russia in 1609. Originally, Żółkiewski advised King Zygmunt III against the 
campaign, as few troops had arrived and those that had were unpaid.55 Since the king personally 
assured the Hetman that he would gather the necessary funds, it can be inferred that Zygmunt III 
was independently funding the army through his own channels, given that the slow-moving Sejm 
had yet to authorize the war and thus the requisite fiduciary resources. This situation was far 
from unique: not only did the diet have to approve funds to pay troops, but the next diet had to 
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ratify the resolution. According to Fredro, this whole process of debating, approving and 
gathering taxes took at least five months.56 Even when a monarch was able to secure the 
necessary funding from the diet, the local dietines lacked the political infrastructure to actually 
enforce collection of taxes it decided on, meaning that the troops still frequently went unpaid. 
This was compounded by the nobility's refusal to agree to a survey of land, which made tax rates 
hard to enforce.57 All this meant that money to pay troops was extremely hard to come by, 
something which would continuously hamper the military efforts of the Commonwealth. 
These financial problems continued well into Żółkiewski’s campaign. After winning a 
great victory at the Battle of Kłuszyn and leading his forces to the gates of Moscow, Żółkiewski 
was negotiating a peace with prominent boyars. He tried to convince his soldiers to persevere 
through the negotiations without pay: “Because with such perseverance, one could with God’s 
help induce this nation [Muscovy] to offer more advantageous conditions for the 
Commonwealth.”58 However, the troops demanded their wages (which the shrewd Muscovites 
offered to pay in exchange for peace) and an end to the conflict, forcing Żółkiewski to broker a 
suboptimal peace for the Commonwealth. This lack of funding continued to plague the reign of 
Zygmunt III. Since the diet was unwilling to approve the taxes necessary to continue paying the 
army, he was forced to surrender Livonia to Sweden as part of the Peace of Altmark in 1629, 
another “disadvantageous” outcome for the Commonwealth.59  
These problems would resurface during the reign of Jan Kazimierz thirty years later. 
Despite military successes in 1660-61, the diets responsible for voting and collecting taxes to pay 
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the army were broken. This left the military, much as it had been during the 1609 campaign, 
unpaid and unwilling to press its advantage by attacking Muscovy and regaining lost territory. 
Jan Chrysostom Pasek (1636 - 1701), a noble and important diarist who was part of the army, 
documented the formation of a union by unpaid troops in 1661. Though Pasek was sympathetic 
to the cause of the union, he wrote: “Our division opposed it, seeing therein great detrimentum to 
our country.”60 Consequently, his memoirs include a speech he gave to discourage his fellow 
soldiers from joining the union and exhorting them to exhibit public virtue. Public virtue, or the 
sacrificing of private interest for the sake of the group, was a central value in szlachta culture,61 
and similar appeals to Pasek’s were made by reformers in the mid eighteenth century.62 The 
speech highlights one of the responses to the ills facing the Commonwealth: a call for moral 
reform, either in addition to or even instead of institutional reform. Thus Pasek began by urging 
patriotic self-sacrifice: “I know not how any man could call himself a son of this fatherland, who 
could wholly forget its public interests for the sake of his private ones.”63 He then continued by 
urging an attack on Muscovy in order to press the Commonwealth’s advantage: “Let us consider 
how these deceitful people [the Muscovites] plundered three-quarters of our fatherland with fire 
and sword. Let us consider how many outrages against God they committed in His churches. Let 
us show them that we too are capable of finding our food abroad in the country which robbed us 
of so much of it.”64 Calls for crusade against the Muslim Ottomans were a frequent tool to try to 
reignite the martial virtue of the nobility through religious warfare,65 and Pasek appealed to a 
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similar sentiment by mentioning desecration of presumably Catholic churches by the Orthodox 
Muscovites. The exhortation to fight strove to unite the fractious gentry against a common foe 
and alleviate financial strain on the Commonwealth, since its troops would sustain themselves by 
looting in foreign lands. Additionally, since the szlachta saw their privileges as a reward their 
ancestors the Sarmathians had received from a grateful monarch for military services,66 it made 
sense to engage in warfare in order to return the Commonwealth to its golden age and reignite 
the patriotic virtue of the nobility. Within Pasek’s speech, we see a call to moral reform through 
a renewal of public virtue and religious warfare.  
Despite Pasek’s impassioned speech, the paralysis induced by the lack of funding led to 
the signing of the Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667, which made significant territorial concessions to 
Muscovy in exchange for token sums of money.67 This continued the pattern of the Treaties of 
Moscow in 1610 and Altmark in 1629, with the Commonwealth gaining a military advantage 
only to sign unfavorable treaties when the military was starved for money.  
It is important to note, however, that Poland and Lithuania were hardly the only countries 
struggling to pay their armies.  Especially in the first half of the seventeenth century, even 
countries undertaking the so-called “military revolution” still relied heavily on mercenary forces 
and the pillaging of enemy territory, as they had not developed the sophisticated bureaucracies 
necessary to finance their growing armies.68 However, this problem was more acute in the 
Commonwealth since it never developed the mechanisms necessary to consistently pay its 
troops. Furthermore, attacking foreign territory and living off the land was also not possible, 
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since the szlachta were inherently suspicious that foreign wars were a way for their monarchs to 
increase their power at the expense of noble liberties.69     
Polish reformers were hardly blind to these fiduciary problems. Stanisław Karwicki 
advocated for a smaller army but with regular wages, rather than pay requiring ratification by the 
Sejm, saying: “Thus we would avoid so many discomforts, which have during our time 
grievously afflicted the Commonwealth due to the halt in wages. The nation’s jewels are 
dispersed, cities and provinces appropriated, in the end the very free election for the price of 
what is to be paid to the soldiery as wages, extended for sale.”70 Karwicki and other reformers 
were acutely aware that the necessity of Sejm approval for wages led to an ineffective military 
that was unable to defend the Commonwealth. However, the szlachta feared that an army that 
did not require approval of the Sejm for its wages would be too independent, and could easily be 
used by a monarch to fight wars or enforce his will without consent of the nobility, trampling on 
their liberties and leading to the dreaded absolutum dominium. As a result, reformers such as 
Fredro were eager to suggest improvements in discipline and training, identifying license and 
insubordination as the true problems plaguing the armed forces71 and effectively ignoring 
funding issues in favor of calls for moral reform.72 Even those such as Karwicki who advocated 
financial reform were unsuccessful. This was because the lack of a comprehensive land survey 
and the requirement for diet approval and dietine execution of the new tax levy made collection 
of wages time-consuming and inconsistent. This fostered an incredibly fragile system of military 
funding that made it nearly impossible for the army to maintain the initiative. Consequently, the 
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Commonwealth’s leaders were left appealing to their soldiers’ patriotism. Unfortunately, this 
was no substitute for regular pay, and efforts at reviving public virtue fell largely on deaf ears. 
Ultimately, the szlachta’s unwillingness to relinquish political control over the armies’ purse-
strings would be ruthlessly exploited by the partitioning powers, as the Commonwealth’s 
languishing military proved ineffective at protecting its borders.  
Power of Magnates 
While the royal army’s effectiveness was hampered by lack of funding, the private armies 
of magnates had no such troubles. This was because the political system of the Commonwealth 
gave a significant amount of power to the magnates, which in large part contributed to the 
Chmielnicki Uprising and the disastrous Treaty of Kiejdany. While subsequent claims that in its 
latter years the Commonwealth was a magnate oligarchy are to some extent reductionist, it is 
undeniable that families such as the Potocki, Radziwiłł, Sapieha, Lubomirski and Czartoryski 
wielded a large amount of military and political power in Poland and Lithuania. Their power in 
large part stemmed from the royal court’s difficulty in securing funding from the diet. This 
meant that the crown was heavily dependent on loans from wealthy magnates. In return, the 
powerful clans were leased royal lands and the associated revenue.73 While the 1567 diet 
established that a quarter74 of the revenue from these lands would go towards national defense, 
the lack of an effective bureaucracy and land survey meant that monarchs were able to collect 
substantially less in practice.75 This compounded the issue of magnate power, as they became 
even wealthier and the monarchy lost access to regular revenue from crown lands. Additionally, 
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while the royal bureaucracy was often unable to even collect the taxes from its own lands 
effectively, the magnates developed efficient systems for collecting taxes and labor, enslaving 
the peasants and provoking anger and resentment.76 In fact, the Chmielnicki Uprising was at 
least partially due to exploitation of the peasants and Cossacks by regional magnates and 
szlachta. 77 
This situation was bemoaned by many within the Commonwealth, and Karwicki 
proposed the return of all leased lands to the crown upon the renter’s death. This would give the 
monarchy a solid base of revenue from which to collect the funds necessary to pay the army.78 
However, this was never put into practice, and the vast revenue from appropriated crown lands 
gave many magnate families the ability to establish private armies to defend their vast domains 
all over Poland and Lithuania. Immediately after the Chmielnicki Uprising, the entire royal army 
numbered 5400 men, while the palatine of Ruthenia Jeremi Wiśniowiecki (1612 - 1651) could 
muster up to 12,000 men to defend his lands in the southeast.79 Similarly, the “Alban Band” of 
Prince Karol Stanisław Radziwiłł (1734 - 1790) consisted of 6000 retainers lavishly dressed in 
snow white.80 These troops were frequently used to further the interests of the magnates. For 
example, the early response to the Chmielnicki Uprising was almost exclusively from the private 
army of Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, who possessed substantial land holdings in the regions affected by 
the revolt.81 This type of private military intervention naturally did little to soothe the existing 
tensions between the Cossacks and peasants and their magnate overlords, whose power was so 
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extensive that they, not the king, were perceived by Chmielnicki’s followers as the enemy. 
During the beginning of the revolt, Chmielnicki maintained his loyalty to the king, insisting that 
his quarrel was with the magnates and not the Crown.82 This conceptual disconnect of the king 
from the de facto rulers of the southeast of the Commonwealth illustrates the extent of magnate 
power and independence. Unfortunately, this freedom would be a significant catalyst for the 
woes befalling the Commonwealth after 1648. 
While contributing to tensions with the Cossacks and peasantry, the power of the 
magnates also allowed them to conduct their own foreign policy and diplomacy, which often had 
dramatic military consequences. This was illustrated by the period from 1648 to 1660, a time of 
unique crisis for the Commonwealth as it conducted a war against Muscovy before being 
invaded by Sweden in 1655. Lithuania in particular had been devastated by the Muscovites, and 
the local nobility felt abandoned by the Poles as the diet refused to approve the necessary 
funding for its military defense.83 These ill feelings were exacerbated by anti-Protestant 
sentiment targeted against Janusz Radziwiłł (1612 - 1655), one of the premier magnates in 
Lithuania and also a Calvinist.84 Not surprisingly, the troops sent to face Sweden had extremely 
low morale, and capitulated at Ujście after a brief struggle. This, coupled with a resumed 
Muscovite offensive, convinced Radziwiłł that the Grand Duchy needed to beg for Swedish 
protection in order to preserve the liberties of its gentry. Consequently, he signed a treaty at 
Kiejdany in 1655 which effectively abolished the Polish-Lithuanian Union and established 
Lithuania as essentially a Swedish vassal.  
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The surrender at Ujście and the subsequent Treaty of Kiejdany set off a chain reaction of 
military disasters, leading to the occupation of most of Poland by Sweden. The Polish szlachta 
were reluctant to contribute their own funds to the war effort in Lithuania, and Radziwiłł 
subsequently allied himself with Sweden in order to protect his own interests and those of the 
local nobility.  
While there were a variety of factors leading up to the Chmielnicki Uprising and the 
Treaty of Kiejdany, the power and influence of prominent magnate families can be seen as a 
major contributor to these disastrous events. Both saw the military effectiveness of the 
Commonwealth severely hampered by the independent actions taken by these magnates acting in 
their own self-interest or in the interests of some subgroup within the Commonwealth.  
Conclusion 
These examples involving military composition, underfunding of the army, and power of 
the magnates serve to illustrate the inability to establish a larger modern standing army, as well 
as the lack of funding and military decentralization that hamstrung the military operations of 
Poland and Lithuania, particularly after 1648. The Commonwealth’s failure to establish a large 
standing army was evidenced by the controversy and eventual dissolution of Cossack Register, 
which would permanently cripple the ability of Poland and Lithuania to wage war. This failure to 
modernize can also be seen in the predominance of cavalry, which proved ineffective against 
more Westernized armies. While there were concerted efforts at reform during the reigns of Jan 
Kazimierz and August II, they were doomed by political controversy. This left an army that was 
not only antiquated and small but also underpaid, as inefficient bureaucracy and competing 
interests confounded efforts to regularly pay the Commonwealth’s soldiers. Consequently, 
29 
commanders in the field such as Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski and Jan Chrysostom Pasek were 
forced to unsuccessfully appeal to sentiments of patriotism and self-sacrifice in order to induce 
their soldiers to fight. Finally, the outsized power of magnates allowed them a degree of 
autonomy which precipitated the catastrophic Chmielnicki Uprising and the Treaty of Kiejdany. 
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